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ASSESSING THE RISKS: TORT LIABILITY AND RISK
MANAGEMENT IN THE EVENT OF A COMMERCIAL
HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT VEHICLE ACCIDENT
MICHAEL C. MINEIRO, ESQ.*
I. INTRODUCTION
N THE EARLY 21st century, the private commercial space
transportation industry demonstrated that commercial
human space transportation is both technologically and eco-
nomically feasible. In 2004, the United States Congress re-
sponded and granted the Department of Transportation (DOT)
the authority to implement regulatory standards to govern com-
mercial human space flight.
Today, the U.S. commercial human space flight (CHSF) in-
dustry is developing launch vehicles that will carry paying par-
ticipants on suborbital flights. The DOT has granted permits to
test this experimental vehicle technology, and it is anticipated
that CHSF vehicles carrying space flight participants will enter
into operation in the near future. As CHSF vehicles begin oper-
ation, questions of tort liability and risk management will need
to be addressed.
To that end, this article examines U.S. tort liability law within
the paradigm of a potential CHSF vehicle accident. Given the
extensive nature of tort law, this section focuses on negligence,
strict liability for third party damage, and products liability as it
relates to CHSF operators, pilots/crew, space flight participants
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(SFPs), and vehicle manufacturers. Analogies are drawn from
aviation and adventure sports/tourism for assessment of poten-
tial causes of action, defendants, plaintiffs, and applicable stan-
dards of care. This article examines and assesses the role of U.S.
state law and recent state legislative initiatives regarding tort lia-
bility. It also evaluates whether strict liability for third party
damage should be imposed on CHSF operators. Further, it dis-
cusses reciprocal cross-waivers of liability and informed consent
provisions established by federal law within the context of tort
defense. This article advises CHSF operators, pilots/crew, SFPs,
and vehicle manufacturers to protect themselves against eco-
nomic loss attributable to likely tort liability resulting from a
CHSF vehicle accident. Finally, it presents proposals for legal
reform in the area of CHSF tort liability.
The potential CHSF vehicle accident discussed in this article
is presumed to have occurred within the United States on a
flight that departs and arrives from points within the United
States. The reason for this presumption is to limit the scope of
accident analysis to U.S. domestic tort law. The role of interna-
tional law in the event of an international accident is given
credence and addressed, although briefly.
II. DEFINING COMMERCIAL HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT
Commercial human space flight is the transport of persons to,
from, or through outer space for compensation. The critical el-
ement that distinguishes CHSF from other forms of human
space flight is the commercial nature of the transportation.
CHSF is not defined in either international law or United
States law. The definition provided for "CHSF" is derived from
an examination of the common usage of the terms "commer-
cial," "human," "space," and "flight."
In common usage, the term "commercial" is related to, or
pertains to, commerce and the engagement of commerce.'
"Commerce," in this context, is the buying, selling, or exchange
of merchandise or services. 2 "Transportation" is the action or
process of moving, carrying, or conveying people or goods from
one place to another. "Flight" is one mode of transportation
I THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 451 (Lesley Brown et al.
eds., 1993).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 3373-74.
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related to flying or moving through air.4 In this sense, the use of
the term "space flight" is misleading, as vehicle propulsion in
outer space does not exhibit the same characteristics of tradi-
tional terrestrial air flight. Nonetheless, the term "human space
flight" has been adopted in the language of U.S. federal law and
regulatory documents relating to commercial human space
transportation.' For the purpose of consistency with U.S. law
and regulatory documentation, this paper will adopt the phrase
"human space flight." CHSF should be viewed as a mode of
transportation distinct from terrestrial air flight and be consid-
ered a unique class of commercial space transportation.
No rule of conventional international law has been estab-
lished to define where airspace ends and outer space begins.6
Likewise, no U.S. law or regulation defines or demarcates air
and outer space. This author accepts the proposition that at
minimum a logically inferred legal definition of outer space "be-
gins at least from the height above the earth of the lowest peri-
gee of any existing or past artificial satellite that has orbited the
earth without encountering any protest."7 It is interesting to
note that the U.S. DOT awards commercial astronaut wings to
pilots and flight crew on board a licensed launch vehicle on a
flight that exceeds 80.45 kilometers as recognition for having
reached outer space.' As suborbital transport systems and high-
altitude platform vehicles enter into service, this legal ambiguity
in delimitation of air and outer space will need to be addressed
in order to resolve questions of concurrent conflicting air and
outer space legal norms.
III. HISTORY OF CHSF
Until the early 1980s, space launch activities were in the exclu-
sive domain of the States. While some private commercial space
4 Id. at 974.
5 See, e.g., Commercial Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. § 70101(a) (3) (2000
& Supp. V 2006).
6 Michael C. Mineiro, The United States and the Legality of Outer Space Weaponiza-
tion: A Proposal for Greater Transparency and a Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 33 AN-
NALS AIR & SPACE L. 441, 444 (2008).
7 Christopher M. Petras, "Space Force Alpha"* Military Use of the International Space
Station and the Concept of "Peaceful Purposes", 53 A.F. L. REv. 135, 155 (2002).
8 Patricia Grace Smith, Assoc. Adm'r for Commercial Space Transp., Fed. Avia-
tion Admin., Remarks at the Presentation of FAA Commercial Astronaut Wings
to SpaceShipOne Pilot Mike Melvill (June 21, 2004), available at http://www.faa.
gov/about/office-org/headquartersoffices/ast/media/PGSMelvillwings.
2004-06-21.pdf, (transcript indicates the distance to be 50 miles).
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activity had begun in the satellite telecommunication industry,
launch vehicles and related services to launch commercial satel-
lites were government operations. During the 1980s, Europe
and the United States began offering private commercial launch
services. While there are a variety of reasons why this change
occurred, the end result is that today, commercial launch ser-
vices are available on a worldwide basis.
In 1998, Eric Anderson founded Space Adventures, the first
company in the world to offer space flights to private citizens.'
Space Adventures successfully marketed and booked private citi-
zens to fly on Russian manned space vehicles.' ° While the Rus-
sian government owned and operated the vehicles, the flights
were for remuneration and could arguably be considered the
first commercial human space flights."
On October 4, 2004, SpaceShipOne won the Ansari X-Prize by
successfully launching a vehicle carrying human beings on sub-
orbital trajectories to an altitude of 112 kilometers.' 2 Subse-
quently, Richard Branson established Virgin Galactic, the
world's first CHSF operator to offer suborbital flights to private
passengers.' 3 Today, a number of U.S. CHSF operators are pre-
paring to offer suborbital adventure flights, in some cases al-
ready training and medically screening passengers. 4
IV. FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING LICENSING AND
REGULATION OF CHSF
The Commercial Space Launch Act (CLSA), as amended by
the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004
(CSLAA-2004), grants the DOT the authority to implement reg-
ulatory standards to govern commercial human space flight.
The CLSA and related provisions are codified in 49 U.S.C.
§§ 70101-70121 et seq. (the Act).' 5 The Act is the codification




12 Alan Boyle, SpaceShipOne Wins X Prize, MSNBC.coM, Oct. 5, 2004, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6167761/.
13 See Press Release, Scaled Composites, Virgin Group Sign Deal With Paul G.
Allen's Mojave Aerospace (Sept. 27, 2004), available at http://www.scaled.com/
projects/tierone/092704 scaled-paul-allenyvirgin-galactic.htm.
14 Jeff Foust, Screening and Training for Commercial Human Spaceflight, SPACE
Rrv., Feb. 18, 2008, available at http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1062/1.




of the CLSA and all of its amendments, including the CSLAA-
2004.
Pursuant to the Act, the Executive Branch has issued regula-
tions and National Space Policy and Space Transportation Di-
rectives. 16 Together the Act, Regulations, and Directives are the
primary law and regulation governing U.S. CHSF.
It should be clarified at this point that the Act, Regulations,
and Directives are not the sole federal laws governing CHSF op-
erations. Like any business, CHSF will include an array of activi-
ties, from marketing to financing to actual flight operations. As
a result, CHSF is subject to a range of federal laws and regula-
tions (e.g., Federal Communications Commission (FCC) radio
frequency licensing).
The Act is legislation designed fundamentally to license com-
mercial space launch vehicles and launch sites, and serves as the
regulatory regime for actual commercial human space flight
(i.e., the transport of persons on a vehicle to outer space for
remuneration). This regulatory authority has been imple-
mented within a DOT vehicle licensing.
V. THE CHALLENGE OF CHSF LIABILITY ASSESSMENT
The major challenge when assessing potential liability for per-
sons and entities involved in CHSF is the categorization of re-
spective parties' legal duties. Commercial human space flight
exhibits functional characteristics of commercial aviation, com-
mercial space launches, adventure sports, and tourism. Legal
precedent exists in respective fields that can assist in determin-
ing the appropriate legal duties, standards of care, immunities,
and defenses for commercial human space flight. The difficulty
is predicting how courts will interpret current federal and state
statutory law and common law and how the law will be applied
in litigation arising from a CHSF accident. The CHSF industry
is still in a stage of embryonic development. CHSF vehicles have
not yet carried paying passengers. Federal law provides mini-
mum guidance on tort liability-only legislating in the areas of
mandatory cross-waivers of liability, licensee insurance and fi-
nancial responsibility requirements, and catastrophic indemnifi-
cation. As a result, parties involved in CHSF must do their best
to determine potential risk by drawing analogies to other
activities.
16 See Commercial Space Transportation Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 401 (2008).
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VI. GENERAL OVERVIEW: TORTS
A tort is a "civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for
which a remedy may be obtained, usu [ally] in the form of dam-
ages; a breach of a duty that the law imposes on persons who
stand in a particular relation to one another.
17
Tort law has three primary functions or goals: (1) compensating
persons sustaining a loss or harm as a result of another's con-
duct; (2) placing the cost of that compensation on those who, in
justice, ought to bear it, but only on such persons; and (3)
preventing future losses and harms.'8
Modern tort liability cases are classified into intentional torts,
property torts, dignitary torts, economic torts, nuisance, negli-
gence, and strict liability torts.
VII. CAUSES OF ACTION AND POTENTIAL DEFENDANTS
In the event of a CHSF vehicle accident, U.S. commercial avia-
tion litigation provides a model upon which to assess potential
tort liability risks. 9 In general, litigation of commercial aviation
accidents in the United States that result in injury to either pas-
sengers or third parties focuses on two causes of action: negli-
gent acts and defective products. Typical aviation accident
litigation includes claims of negligence against air carriers, pi-
lots, and manufacturers.2 ° In some cases, air traffic control
(ATC) negligence is also alleged.2 ' Products liability claims are
primarily filed against aircraft manufacturers and manufacturers
or suppliers of component parts.2 2 Based on the U.S. aviation
17 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1526 (8th ed. 2004).
18 EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 5 (3d ed. 1999).
19 See Doug Griffith, The Liability Atmosphere: Awaiting the Commercial
Human Spaceflight Industry, Presentation at the Transforming Space 2007 Con-
ference (Nov. 6, 2007) (PowerPoint presentation), available at http://www.cali-
forniaspaceauthority.org/conference2007/images/presentations/071106-1530-
Griffith.pdf. In his presentation, Mr. Griffith comments that state tort law gov-
erning CHSF vehicle accidents may be "derived largely from aircraft accident
cases," focusing on negligence and product liability. Id.
20 SeeWINDLE TURLEY, AVIATION LITIGATION 58-134 (1986) (providing an over-
view of liability for certain defendants).
21 E. Air Lines Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1955); see also
TuRLEY, supra note 20, at 98.
22 TuRLE', supra note 20, at 60. Mr. Turley notes that
[t]he majority of recently reported aviation accident cases involve
strict liability claims against the aircraft manufacturer. To a lesser
extent, strict liability actions are also maintained against the manu-
facturer or supplier of aircraft component parts, and in some in-
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litigation model, one can predict that negligence lawsuits will
arise against CHSF operators, pilots/crew, and ATC, and that
product liability claims will arise against CHSF vehicle manufac-
turers and component parts manufacturers or suppliers.
In the common law courts of the United States, commercial
air carriers, air taxi operators, and most charter services are cate-
gorized as common carriers.23 "Common carrier" is defined as
"'one who engages in the transportation of persons or things
from place to place for hire, and who holds himself out to the
public as ready and willing to serve the public, indifferently, in
the particular line in which he is engaged. '' 24 U.S. courts have
imposed on common carriers a higher degree of care with re-
spect to their passengers.25 Courts that hold common carriers
subject to a higher degree of care impose upon a common car-
rier a duty of "the highest degree of care consistent with the
mode of conveyance used and the practical operation of its busi-
ness."26 Some courts "rather than (or in addition to) making
common carriers liable for failure to exercise the 'highest de-
gree of care,' hold them liable for slight negligence. '"27 "'Slight'
negligence is the failure to exercise great care. 28 Practically,
these distinctions have little impact.29
Whether or not CHSF vehicle operators are held to be com-
mon carriers is a question of fact. To impose common carrier
status, courts will need to find that a CHSF operator "holds itself
out to the public as offering to transport freight or passengers
for a fee."' 0 While CHSF operators have offered their services to
the general public,3' at this point in the development of CHSF,
it is highly unlikely a court will find CHSF operators as offering
stances, against the manufacturer or supplier of accessory items not
incorporated in the aircraft.
Id.
23 See id. at 83. "Airlines, air taxi operators, and most charter services are con-
sidered common carriers. As such, they have a duty to exercise the highest de-
gree of care for the safety of their passengers, although this duty falls short of
making the common carrier an insurer of its passengers' safety." Id.
24 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & MICHAEL MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER LIA-
BILiTY: THE MONTREAL CONVENTION OF 1999 9 (2005) (quoting Burnett v. Rivers,
276 S.W. 347, 349 (Tex. 1925)).
25 Id. at 10. See also KIONKA, supra note 18, at 98-101.
26 KIONKA, supra note 18, at 98.
27 Id. at 100.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 226.
31 Virgin Galactic has advertised their CHSF services to the general public.
3772009]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
transportation to passengers. Instead, courts will most likely
hold CHSF operators are offering a tourism or adventure expe-
rience. CHSF operators are not offering point-to-point trans-
portation service. They advertise the experience of going into
outer space and market CHSF as an adventure flight. Federal
law, specifically, the Act3 2 and the Regulations,3 3 categorizes per-
sons who are not crew, but who are carried on a launch or reen-
try vehicle, as SFPs and not passengers, even if SFPs are paying
participants.3 4 This is indicative of the status of CHSF not as a
mode of transportation but as an adventure experience. 5
As CHSF operations evolve, it is possible CHSF operators may
be deemed common carriers. When CHSF operators begin of-
fering point-to-point transportation services, either to terrestrial
locations or orbiting spacecraft, a stronger argument will exist
for imposing common carrier status on CHSF operators.
In commercial aviation accident litigation, passengers are
generally not defendants to a lawsuit unless evidence exists that
the passenger undertook reckless or intentional conduct that is
casually related to the plaintiffs' alleged injury. While it is possi-
ble that aviation passengers could be sued on the basis of negli-
gence, it is highly unlikely that a passenger could cause an
aviation accident based solely on his or her negligence. Com-
mercial aviation passengers are passive parties, excluded from
participation in the operation of the aircraft, and absent inten-
tional or reckless conduct, very unlikely able to cause serious
injury to fellow passengers and crew or damage to the aircraft.
In contrast to commercial aviation passengers, SFPs may be
able to undertake actions during the operation of the CHSF ve-
hicle that will expose them to negligence tort liability. Potential
SFP negligence liability can be compared to negligence liability
imposed on participants in the adventure sports/tourism con-
32 Commercial Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101-70121 (2000 &
Supp. V 2006).
33 See Commercial Space Transportation Regulations, 14 C.F.R. §§ 400-99
(2008).
34 See id. § 401.5 (defining space flight participants as "an individual, who is not
crew, carried aboard a launch vehicle").
35 Tracey Knutson, What is "Informed Consent"for Space-Flight Participants in the
Soon-To-Launch Space Tourism Industry?, 33 J. SPACE L. 105, 109 & n.17 (2007)
(quoting Commercial Space Transportation Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 415 (2008))
("wherein the FAA/AST expressly states that the CSLAA characterization of
'Space Flight Participant' '. . . signifies that someone on board a launch vehicle
or re-entry vehicle is not a typical passenger with typical expectations of trans-
port, but someone going on an adventure ride."').
378
ASSESSING THE RISKS
text.36 In adventure sports/tourism, participants are actively in-
volved in the undertaking, and a person participating in
adventure sports/tourism activities has a duty to "act like a rea-
sonably prudent person in whatever circumstance[s]
presented. '3 7 Failure of adventure sport/tourism participants to
fulfill this duty may result in negligence liability for the
participant.
Similarly, SFPs have a duty to exercise the standard of care as
a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar
situation. Failure to exercise this duty is negligence and could
result in SFP negligence liability to fellow participants, pilot/
crew, operators, and third parties. Liability exposure will de-
pend on the nature of the SFP's participation. The standard of
care for SFPs will depend on how the courts interpret the rela-
tionships and duties between the SFPs and the pilot, crew, and
CHSF operators, the nature of the activity undertaken, relevant
state and federal law, and public policy. A significant factor to
consider is that the Act and the Regulations treat SFPs as partici-
pants and not passengers, affording them only the protection of
informed consent and training sufficient to protect the inno-
cent public. 8
It is also important to note that unlike most commercial avia-
tion passengers, SFPs are paying relatively large sums of money
for their flight and most likely are high net worth individuals
with the capacity to pay a civil judgment rendered in a plaintiffs
favor.3 9 This capacity to pay provides an incentive for plaintiffs
to include SFPs as defendants and argue SFP liability.
VIII. POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS
The universe of potential plaintiffs in CHSF vehicle accident
cases is larger than in civil aviation. In addition to terrestrial
third party plaintiffs (i.e., persons and property on the ground
and aircraft in flight) and first party plaintiffs (i.e., SFPs, crew,
pilots, their survivors and beneficiaries), CHSF operations pose
36 See id. Ms. Knutson's article provides an excellent examination of CLSAA
informed consent provision and SFP liability, drawing parallels with the adven-
ture travel industry. See id.
37 Id. at 110.
38 Commercial Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. §§ 70102(17) (2000 & Supp.
V 2006).
39 Peter B. de Selding, Swedish Authorities Look to Ease Way for Virgin Galactic,
SPACE NEWS, Apr. 7, 2008, at 16.
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a risk of injury to outer space and high-altitude objects and
personnel.4 °
CHSF vehicle operations are scheduled to begin operation in
high-altitude suborbital trajectories and have the potential to
soon begin operations in LEO. These operations pose a risk to
new technologies that are coming online such as high-altitude
vehicle positioning (HAVP), high-altitude unmanned aerial ve-
hicles (HAUAVs), and other high-altitude projects, as well as
LEO operations. As high-altitude and LEO applications de-
velop, the potential universe of plaintiffs will increase.
With regard to terrestrial third parties, the likelihood of third
party injury in the event of a CHSF vehicle accident is related to
the size of the vehicle, the vehicle materials/composites, flight
paths, and the altitude at which the vehicle operates. Current
CHSF vehicles are relatively small when compared to modern
commercial jet aircraft. This smaller size should lower the risk
factor of injury to terrestrial third parties; however, as CHSF ve-
hicles become larger, the risk of third party injury will corre-
spondingly increase. CHSF vehicles will operate at higher
altitudes than commercial aircraft, potentially expanding the
footprint of falling debris (but also potentially removing the
footprint if the altitude and trajectory allows for atmospheric
burnout). CHSF vehicles will be operating in an environment
that requires different materials/composites than in civil avia-
tion and the technologies employed may be a factor in assessing
terrestrial third party risk from a material strength/survivability
and environmental standpoint.
IX. THE ROLE OF STATE LAW: TORT LAW AND
IMMUNITY LEGISLATION
In the event of an accident involving a CHSF vehicle, negli-
gence and products liability will be the primary tortious legal
basis on which causes of action are undertaken. These forms of
tort liability are primarily governed by state law, and "[d] espite
the traditionally federal character of spaceflight activity, liability
for human spaceflight accidents will be determined by a given
state's tort law."41
40 In the immediate future, CHSF operations are only planned to be con-
ducted as suborbital flights. As CHSF technology develops, CHSF will be con-
ducted in orbit and in other locations that pose a risk to space objects and
persons.
41 Griffith, supra note 19.
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State law poses a unique challenge when assessing and manag-
ing liability risk. Depending on the jurisdiction in which the
claim is litigated, different legal standards will apply to deter-
mine standards of care and enforceability of contracts.
Federal legislation has not been enacted to preempt state tort
law in the field of CHSF. While states are prohibited from hav-
ing laws inconsistent with federal law, the Act specifically grants
states the authority to implement law in addition to or more
stringent than a requirement of, or regulation prescribed
under, the Act.4 2
States have enacted or proposed legislation (sometimes called
"commercial space initiatives") designed to facilitate the devel-
opment of commercial space activities in their respective juris-
dictions. One aspect of commercial space initiatives are liability
and immunity provisions that shield entities engaged in com-
mercial space activities from certain types of tort liability.
In 2007, Virginia became the first state to enact legislation
providing conditional immunity to CHSF operators. The Vir-
ginia Space Flight Liability and Immunity Act (Space Flight Act)
shields Federal Aviation Administration Advanced Spaceport
Technology (FAA-AST) licensed entities, including CHSF opera-
tors, from liability arising out of human space flight activities.43
Specifically, the Space Flight Act prohibits human space flight
participants (SFPs as defined in the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 70102),
their representatives, heirs, administrators, executors, assignees,
next of kin, estate, or any other person bringing a claim on be-
half of the SFP from maintaining an action or recovery from a
licensed entity for injury resulting from the risk of spaceflight
activities. 4 Entities may not avail themselves of this immunity if
they commit an act or omission that constitutes gross negligence
evidencing willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the SFP,
and that act or omission proximately caused an SFP injury; or
the entity intentionally causes an SFP injury.45
The Space Flight Act immunity is provisional on the SFP be-
ing informed of the risk of spaceflight activities as required
under federal law, the Act, and the Regulations. 46 The require-
ment to inform SFPs of risk is a codification of the "common law
42 49 U.S.C. § 70117(c).
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principles associated with the 'duty to warn' in adventure
sports. 47 A challenge for spaceflight operators will be deter-
mining what should be explained to SFPs in order to fulfill their
legal duties under statute and common law.48 The Space Flight
Act provides some guidance, giving an example "warning state-
ment" that at a minimum (and in addition to any language re-
quired by federal law) would fulfill the Space Flight Act's
requirement.4 9
In 2008, Florida followed Virginia's lead and adopted the
Spaceflight Informed Consent Act of 2008. It provides condi-
tional liability immunity for CHSF operators for injury or death
resulting from the inherent risks of spaceflight and is structured
similar to Virginia's Spaceflight Act.5 0 New Mexico also has a
bill pending in its state legislature. 51
Recent state legislative initiatives indicate that states are will-
ing to take the lead in facilitating the development of commer-
cial human space flight by providing some measure of liability
protection for operators. While state initiatives do provide pro-
tection, they should be viewed as temporary measures that only
partially remedy the issue of CHSF operator liability. If one
takes the position that CHSF operators would benefit from har-
monization and standardization of relevant law, and that said
harmonization and standardization would facilitate the develop-
ment of the industry, then state law initiatives are insufficient.
State law initiatives apply only in the jurisdiction of the state
where enacted. Depending on the jurisdiction where litigation
is filed and choice of law provisions (contractual, statutory, or
common law), state immunity legislation may or may not be ap-
plicable. As a result, CHSF operators still face a multiplicity of
possible legal standards and liability exposure. For the time be-
ing, CHSF operators should be aware of state initiatives and con-
duct operations in jurisdictions with favorable state laws. At the
same time, CHSF operators should contract with SFPs for pre-
ferred choice-of-law provisions.
47 Knutson, supra note 35, at 113.
48 Id.
49 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-227.10 (2009).
50 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 331.501 (2009).
51 S.B. 37, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009).
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X. IMPOSING STRICT LIABILITY ON CHSF VEHICLE
OPERATOR(S) FOR DAMAGE CAUSED TO THIRD
PARTIES ON THE GROUND, IN THE AIR,
OR IN OUTER SPACE
A negligence tort is "a tort committed by failure to observe
the standard of care required by law under the circumstances. '52
Liability for negligent conduct is premised on the idea that "all
persons are under a duty to conduct themselves in all of their
diverse activities so as not to create unreasonable risks of physi-
cal harm to others. '53 The components of a cause of action for
negligence are duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages.54
Like all persons, CHSF vehicle operators are tasked with a gen-
eral duty of care not to commit a negligent act (i.e., a duty to
"exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person
would have exercised in a similar situation"). 5 5
In addition to negligence, courts sometimes impose strict lia-
bility. Strict liability is "[1]iability that does not depend on ac-
tual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the
breach of an absolute duty to make something safe. 56 Absent
statutory rules, whether CHSF vehicle operators are subject to
strict liability for damage caused by a CHSF vehicle to third par-
ties on the ground, in the air, or in outer space will be a point of
litigation decided by the courts.
To date, there are no court cases directly applicable to CHSF
vehicle operations. Legal precedent in the fields of aviation and
rocketry provide insight on likely judicial interpretations of law
and policy because CHSF vehicles exhibit functional characteris-
tics of both aviation and rocketry. In cases involving ground
damage caused by aircraft and rockets, courts have ruled on the
applicability of strict liability standards.57 These cases, read in
conjunction with the Second and Third (Final Draft) Restate-
ment of Torts, provide a basis from which to infer whether
courts should apply strict liability to CHSF operators for damage
caused to third parties on the ground, in the air, or in outer
space.
52 BLACK'S LAw DICTIo ARY, supra note 17, at 1527.
53 KIONKA, supra note 18, at 54.
54 Id. at 55.
55 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1061.
56 Id. at 934.
57 See, e.g., Wood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 223 N.Y.S.2d 692, 697 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1961); Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 56 Cal. Rpt. 128, 131 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1967).
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A. ON THE GROUND
Tort liability standards for ground damage from aircraft have
evolved over time. Initially, operating an aircraft was deemed to
be an abnormally dangerous activity and therefore strict liability
was imposed.58 During the 1950s and 1960s, courts began to
hold that "in light of the technical progress achieved in the de-
sign, construction, operation and maintenance of aircraft gener-
ally, that flying should no longer be deemed to be an ultra-
hazardous activity, requiring the imposition of absolute liability
for any damage or injury caused in the course thereof. '5' These
holdings represented a departure from the imposition of strict
liability based on the theory that aviation was no longer an ab-
normally dangerous activity.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes strict liability for
operators of aircraft for physical harm to land, person, or chat-
tels on the ground caused by the ascent, descent or flight of an
aircraft, or by the dropping or falling of an object from the air-
craft.6" The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the position
that "while the safety record is greatly improved it still cannot be
said that the danger of ground damage has been so eliminated
or reduced that the ordinary rules of negligence law should be
applied."'" Since the adoption of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, courts continued to move towards a negligence standard
of liability for ground damage caused by aircraft.6 2 The Restate-
ment (Third Final-Draft) of Torts recognizes that "aviation does
not fit the formal Restatement criteria for abnormally danger-
ous activity" and leaves open the question whether or not strict
or negligence liability should be imposed for ground damage.63
The Restatement (Third Final-Draft) of Torts does present the
defendant's control over the instrumentality of harm as an alter-
native rationale for the imposition of strict liability as "impres-
sively applicable in aviation ground-damage cases. "64
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (1976).
59 Wood, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 697; see also TURLEY, supra note 20, at 54. "Aviation in
general, however, is no longer itself considered an ultrahazardous activity render-
ing carriers strictly liable for all accidents, although the Restatement indicates
that pilots and owners are strictly liable under this theory for ground damage
caused by aviation accidents." Id.
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 57.
61 Id.
62 Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co., 746 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Wash. 1987).
63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20 cmt. k




Case law involving ground damage from rockets is limited.
There are two cases, both from the 1960s, in which the plaintiffs
brought tort actions for compensation due to the effect of
rocket engine testing.6 5 The damage caused by the rocket en-
gine tests was analogized to damage resulting from blasting.66
In both cases, the courts held the defendants strictly liable on a
theory that the activity undertaken was ultra-hazardous (i.e., ab-
normally dangerous) and that public policy concerns required
the imposition of strict liability for trespass.67
Parties in favor of strict liability for ground damage caused by
CHSF vehicle operations can draw several analogies in support
of their position. First, the historical development of aviation
demonstrates an evolution from strict liability to negligence as
the industry matured, underlying technology developed, and
the likelihood of airplane crashes occurring absent tortious con-
duct lessened.68 Similarly, CHSF is a new industry without suffi-
cient flight experience to establish a basis on which to estimate
risk to the uninvolved public or determine the likelihood of a
vehicle crash absent tortious conduct and whose technology is
in the developmental stages. Second, CHSF vehicles are in the
exclusive control of the operators, an argument presented in
favor of strict liability for ground damage caused by airplanes
that is equally valid when applied to CHSF vehicles. 69 Third, an
argument exists that CHSF launch/reentry/and suborbital
flight operations meet the criteria of an abnormally dangerous
activity and, hence, should be subject to strict liability. Restate-
65 See Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 128, 131 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967); Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., Thiokol Chem. Corp.; 181 A.2d 487, 489
(NJ. Sup. Ct. 1962).
66 See Smith, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 134; Berg, 181 A.2d at 410.
67 See Smith, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 142; Berg, 181 A.2d at 410.
68 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 62. The drafters note that
almost all airplane crashes occur because of tortious conduct-the
negligence of the airline, the negligence of federal air-traffic con-
trol, or a defective product supplied by the aircraft manufacturer.
Indeed, in cases brought on behalf of airline passengers, liability is
rarely contested. A quite small (yet ultimately unquantifiable) per-
centage of all airplane crashes happen utterly without negligence
or tortious conduct.
Id.
69 See id. (stating "[n] evertheless, as Comment f has emphasized, one rationale
for strict liability relates to the defendant's exclusive control over the instrumen-
tality of harm, and this rationale is impressively applicable in aviation ground-
damage cases.").
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ment (Second) Torts § 520 provides six criteria to determine
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous:
(a) existence of high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that re-
sults from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the
exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not
a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity
to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its
value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.7 °
CHSF does exhibit several of the characteristics listed in § 520.
CHSF is not yet of common usage,71 poses a risk of some harm
that cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care,
and it is likely that the harm that results from a CHSF vehicle
accident will be great. 72 Points of contention are how "high" the
degree of risk is, the appropriateness of the activity to the place
where it is carried on, and the extent to which its value to the
community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.7 3
Parties in favor of negligence for ground damage can present
a doctrinal argument that strict liability for vehicle operators is
no longer of significance.7 ' This argument presumes that, simi-
lar to aviation accidents, most CHSF accidents will be caused by
negligence or defective products. 75 The problem is that CHSF
has not had time to establish a history of accidents that supports
this presumption. Initially, the cause of CHSF accidents may re-
70 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 57, with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 62 (providing two criteria to determine whether an
activity is abnormally dangerous: "(1) the activity creates a foreseeable and highly
significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised by all
actors; and (2) the activity is not one of common usage.").
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 57, at cmt. i (defining com-
mon usage as "[a]n activity is a matter of common usage if it is customarily car-
ried on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community."); see
also Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co., 746 P.2d 1198, 1207 (Wash. 1987) (Brachtenbach,
J., dissenting) (arguing for the adoption of the definition of RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i).
72 If a CHSF vehicle or component part causes harm to a structure or person,
it is likely to be significant given the altitude and velocities at which CHSF vehi-
cles operate. Simple trespass on land without damaging persons, structures, or
the economic value of the land is possible, but not likely. The best case scenario
for a CHSF accident is for it to occur over an uninhabited location where there is
no economic activity. The worst case scenario is for a CHSF accident to occur
over a city or populated area.
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 57, at cmt. i.




main unknown or may not be the result of negligence or defec-
tive products.
Courts should rule in favor of imposing strict liability against
licensed vehicle operators for ground damage caused by CHSF
vehicles. CHSF vehicle safety, reliability, technology, and regula-
tion have not yet reached the level of development achieved in
modern civil aviation; thereby negating an argument in favor of
adopting modern aviation negligence standards while support-
ing the position that CHSF is abnormally dangerous. CHSF is a
unique and rare undertaking and it may be several decades
before CHSF has evolved to the point of common usage. The
imposition of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities is
"designed largely to protect innocent third parties or innocent
bystanders" and uninvolved parties on the ground that have no
control over the CHSF vehicle and no means to prevent or miti-
gate the harm.76 As Dean Prosser aptly stated: "'The problem
[of imposing strict liability] is dealt with as one of allocating a
more or less inevitable loss to be charged against a complex and
dangerous civilization, and liability is placed upon the party best
able to shoulder it."'' 7 7 And in relation to innocent third parties
on the ground, CHSF vehicle operators are in a better position
to prevent and absorb loss.
B. IN THE AIR
Aircraft operators owe a duty of ordinary care to other aircraft
operators that includes complying with FAA regulations, adher-
ing to filed flight plans, operating at the proper altitude and
speed, keeping proper lookout, and yielding the right of way.78
Failure to observe this standard of care is negligence. 79 Simi-
larly, CHSF vehicle operators, like all persons, are under a duty
to exercise the standard of care a reasonably prudent person
would have exercised in a similar situation.80 One can analogize
from aviation that CHSF vehicle operators owe a duty of care to
all other vehicles in the air which includes compliance with FAA
regulations, adherence to filed flight plans, etc., and that failure
to observe this standard of care is negligence.
76 Id. § 24 cmt. a.
77 Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 128, 137 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967) (quoting PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 318 (2d ed. 1955)).
78 TuRLEY, supra note 20, at 85.
79 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1572.
80 Id.
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In addition to negligence, courts could impose strict liability
on CHSF vehicle operators for damage caused to other vehicles
in the air. The most likely rationale for imposition of strict lia-
bility is that CHSF is an abnormally dangerous activity like
rocket test firing. Just as damage caused on the ground is sub-
ject to strict liability, so should damage caused in the air.8 How-
ever, there is a distinction that can be drawn between the
imposition of strict liability on CHSF and rocket activities for
damage on the ground as opposed to damage in the air. Unlike
injured parties on the ground, aircraft (and other vehicles in
the air) and their passengers can be said to have assumed a de-
gree of risk that accompanies all air travel.82 This assumption of
risk includes risks inherent in operating an aircraft in airspace
that is accessible to CHSF vehicles. Therefore, CHSF vehicle op-
erators should not be held strictly liable, but instead should be
subject to the duty of ordinary care owed to all other vehicles
operating in the air.83
There is also an inconsistency in applying strict liability to
CHSF vehicles for damage caused to aircraft in flight but not to
aircraft for damage caused to CHSF vehicles in flight. If courts
impose strict liability on CHSF, they will be distinguishing air-
craft from CHSF vehicles and imposing different standards of
care within the same spatial region (i.e., airspace). Ruling as
such, the courts will inadvertently make conclusions as to
whether CHSF vehicles are aircraft or spacecraft and, as such,
whether they should be subject to the same standards of tort
liability. The precedent established by ruling in favor of strict
liability for CHSF vehicles would have implications in other legal
arenas grappling with the issue of whether CHSF vehicles
should be categorized as aircraft or spacecraft and thereby sub-
ject to the legal norms respectively applicable. This is because
underlying the question of strict liability is a question of whether
81 KIONKA, supra note 18, at 41.
82 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 62, § 24 cmt. d.
83 The duty owed to all other vehicles operating in the air should not be con-
fused with the duty owed to passengers or participants. If CHSF operators are
held to be common carriers either a higher degree of care or higher duty of care
will be imposed on CHSF operators towards their passengers but not towards
other vehicles operating in the same airspace. See DEMPSEY & MILDE, supra note
24, at 10-11. Regardless of whether CHSF operators are held to be common
carriers, there is a general duty not to commit negligent acts that cause injury to
other vehicles in the air. See id. The question is whether courts will impose an




CHSF should be subject to the legal norms of aviation or outer
space. Courts should be reluctant to set a precedent at this
time. Instead, courts should support a negligence standard on
the basis of equity for all vehicles operating in airspace, regard-
less of whether they are air or spacecraft, thereby reserving the
issue of strict liability for federal and state legislatures.
C. IN OUTER SPACE
CHSF vehicle operators, like all persons in space or all per-
sons who place an object in space, are under a duty to exercise
the standard of care a reasonably prudent person would have
exercised in a similar situation. s4 Failure of CHSF vehicle opera-
tors to exercise reasonable care in activities in outer space will
expose them to potential negligence liability.
This duty of reasonable care is not affected by the Convention
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
(Liability Convention).85 The Liability Convention provides an
alternative method for resolution of liability for damage caused
by space objects that allows States "which suffer damage [ ], or
whose natural or juridical persons suffer damage, [to] present
to a launching State a claim for compensation of such dam-
age. ''8 6 But the Liability Convention does not impose domestic
tort liability standards and does not preclude individuals from
pursuing remedies in domestic courts.8 7 Individuals are allowed
to file negligent tort claims in U.S. domestic courts for damage
caused by CHSF vehicles to objects or persons in outer space,
subject to the laws of the United States. 8
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur provides that "in some cir-
cumstances, the mere fact of an accident's occurrence raises an
inference of negligence so as to establish a prima facie case."8' 9
"'The doctrine implies that the court does not know, and cannot
84 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1572.
85 See Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects art. VII, Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability
Convention].
86 Id. at art. VIII.
87 The intent of the Liability Treaty is to provide a legal mechanism for States
to claim damages. Nothing in the treaty prohibits individuals from pursuing a
domestic remedy. This interpretation of the treaty is consistent with the text of
the treaty, the travaux preparatories of the treaty, historical context, and general
rules of international law.
88 Commercial Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. § 70117(c) (2000 & Supp. V
2006).
89 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1336.
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find out, what actually happened in the individual case. Instead,
the finding of likely negligence is derived from knowledge of
the causes of the type or category of accidents involved."' 90
CHSF vehicle accidents in outer space are an appropriate type
of accident for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to be invoked,
which shifts the burden of proof of negligence to the
defendants. 91
The environment of outer space and our current ability to
operate in outer space prevents accident "site" investigation and
debris recovery. As a matter of fact, "site" investigation is impos-
sible unless the accident occurred on a celestial body.92 To fur-
ther complicate matters, only limited capabilities exist to track
space objects. Most, if not all, evidence related to an outer
space CHSF vehicle accident will be in terrestrial recordings and
data. Given the limited capacity of plaintiffs to conduct an in-
vestigation of CHSF'vehicle accidents in outer space, courts will
most likely rely heavily on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Courts should not impose strict liability on CHSF vehicle op-
erators for damage caused to objects in outer space. First, it is
fundamentally inequitable for strict liability to apply only to
CHSF vehicles and not to other objects/vehicles in outer space.
While CHSF vehicles pose a threat to other objects in space, that
threat is not significantly greater than any other object in
space.9" There is nothing abnormally dangerous about CHSF
vehicle activities as compared to other space activities. 4 Simply
imposing strict liability on CHSF vehicles for damage caused to
space objects cart blanche is without equitable basis.
Second, space objects may be negligently piloted, derelict, or
otherwise malfunction as to cause a collision with a CHSF vehi-
90 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17 cmt. a (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 2001)).
91 Id.
92 Under general rules of physics, in outer space the momentum of objects will
carry them over a period of time in a particular direction to a different location
relative to the point earlier in time. The result is that the 'site' of the accident is
only a spatial reference point at a specific period of time.
93 See, e.g., John - Derral Mulholland & Christian Veillet, A Space Debris Primer
for Astronomers, 2 SPACE DEBRIS 295, 301-02 (2000) (stating that size of object in
space does not matter in terms of interference and collisions); C. Pardini & L.
Anselmo, Assessing the Risk of Orbital Debris Impact, 1 SPACE DEBRIS 59, 60 (1999)
("Objects larger than 10-20 cm may cause the fatal breakup of spacecraft in
collision.").
94 See Mulholland & Veillet, supra note 92; Pardini & Anselmo, supra note 92.
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cle.95 In the absence of direct evidence, fault can be inferred
from known orbital parameters, satellite registries, and other
"knowledge of the causes of the type or category of accidents
involved .... "96
Third, the Liability Convention applies liability for damage to
space objects or persons on board a space object only if the
damage is due to fault.9' Courts should consider that one of the
Liability Convention's stated purposes is "full and equitable
measure of compensation to victims."98 Even though the Liabil-
ity Convention does not apply to domestic tort claims, its refusal
to impose strict liability is relevant legal precedent.
Imposition of strict liability for damage caused to persons not
on board a space object can be distinguished from persons on
board. Public policy arguments favoring imposing strict liability
for damage caused to persons in outer space (i.e., on a space
walk), but not while on board a space object, include the rela-
tive vulnerability of persons in outer space and the utmost im-
portance of protecting human life and preventing future
accidents. Of course, strict liability is not absolute. If a person
intentionally collides with a CHSF vehicle or commits an act of
gross negligence, courts may refuse to impose strict liability on
vehicle operators.
The potential liability for damage caused to space objects is
significant. As CHSF and other commercial space activities de-
velop, CHSF vehicles will eventually begin conducting opera-
tions near or at space objects. Once CHSF vehicles are operated
near or at space objects, there will be a corresponding increase
in the probability of a collision occurring between CHSF vehi-
cles and space objects. This higher probability will result in
higher risks of loss, which is a serious concern for the insurance
industry that may impact the cost of insurance policies. One
can imagine that the damages for the destruction of an orbiting
space hotel and death of all its inhabitants could be in the hun-
dreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars. Law and policy mak-
ers should begin today to assess the issue of tort liability because
once significant commercial space activities are undertaken; the
issue of tort liability for damage caused on the ground, in the
air, and in outer space will be of critical importance.
95 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 62.
96 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1336.
97 Liability Convention, supra note 84, at art. III.
98 Id. at prnbl.
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XI. FEDERAL LAW: THE ACT'S RISK SHARING REGIME
The Act establishes a risk sharing regime. This regime is com-
prised of mandatory cross-waivers of liability, insurance and fi-
nancial responsibility requirements, and conditional
catastrophic indemnification. Critical to this regime is the ex-
clusion of SFPs.99 Within the federal regulations, SFPs are spe-
cifically excluded from the definition of "customer," and not
listed in the definition of "contractor or subcontractor. '"10 0 As a
result, SFPs are not placed within the mandatory cross-waivers of
liability (with the exception of those applicable to the federal
government), insurance and financial responsibility, and indem-
nification provisions applicable to customers, contractors, or
subcontractors of CHSF licensed operators. 10 '
Under mandatory cross-waivers of liability, each party to the
waiver agrees to be responbile for property damage or loss it
sustains or for personal injury to, death of, or property damage
or loss sustained by its own employees. 1 2 The government is in
the envious position of receiving protection of mandatory cross-
waivers from operators (their customers, contractors and sub-
contractors), crew, and SFPs. 1°3 Licensed operators also receive
the benefit of mandatory cross-waivers, but those protections are
not mandated as applicable to crew or SFPs.104 The Act's silence
on mandatory cross-waiver provisions between licensed opera-
tors and SFPs allows for contractual agreements that shift the
risk of loss from SFPs to operators.10 5
The Act has a three-tier financial responsibility risk sharing
mechanism that provides financial protection for licensed oper-
ators. First, operators are required to carry liability insurance or
demonstrate financial responsibility to compensate for maxi-
99 See generally, Commercial Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. §§ 70112-70113
(2000 & Supp. V 2006).
100 Commercial Space Transportation Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 430.3 (2008).
101 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 440.9, 440.17.
102 49 U.S.C. § 70112(b).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Hughes & Rosenburg, supra note 102, at 59.
Absent enforceable private contractual arrangements between a
space flight participant and the vehicle operator (licensee) holding
the participant harmless and indemnified by the operator, ineligi-
bility may prove to be a substantial deterrent to an individual, par-
ticularly a wealthy one with "deep pockets," in deciding whether to
engage in space flight.
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mum probable loss (MPL)lO6 from claims of third parties and
claims from the U.S. government for damage or loss of property
from an activity carried out under the license.1"7 Second, condi-
tioned on Congressional budget approval, the federal govern-
ment accepts the risk of loss above mandatory insurance or
demonstration of financial responsibility up to $1.5 billion (ad-
justed for inflation (AFI) from January 1, 1989).'°' Third, above
$1.5 billion (AFI 1989) licensed operators are financially
responsible.10 9
While the Act provides a mechanism for Congressional ap-
proval and funding of a compensation plan, it does not require
Congress to indemnify."O This decision is ultimately left to the
discretion of Congress as to whether it will exercise its spending
power to that end.11' While this indemnification provision is a
strong public statement of support for the CHSF industry and
106 14 C.F.R. § 440.3. MPL is defined as:
the greatest dollar amount of loss for bodily injury or property dam-
age that is reasonably expected to result from a licensed or permit-
ted activity; (1) Losses to third parties, excluding Government
personnel and other launch or reentry participants' employees in-
volved in licensed or permitted activities, that are reasonably ex-
pected to result from a licensed or permitted activity are those that
have a probability of occurrence of no less than one in ten million.
(2) Losses to Government property and Government personnel in-
volved in licensed or permitted activities that are reasonably ex-
pected to result from licensed or permitted activities are those that
have a probability of occurrence of no less than one in one hun-
dred thousand.
Id.
107 49 U.S.C. § 70112.
108 Id. § 70113. The Act states that
[t]o the extent provided in advance in an appropriation law or to
the extent additional legislative authority is enacted providing for
paying claims in a compensation plan submitted under subsection
(d) of this section, the Secretary of Transportation shall provide for
the payment by the United States Government of a successful claim
(including reasonable litigation or settlement expenses) of a third
party against a licensee or transferee under this chapter, a contrac-
tor, subcontractor, or customer of the licensee or transferee, or a
contractor or subcontractor of a customer, [but not against a space
flight participant], resulting from an activity carried out under the
license issued or transferred under this chapter for death, bodily
injury, or property damage or loss resulting from an activity carried
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may be comforting, operators and insurers should beware that
in the event of a catastrophic accident, their indemnification is
not guaranteed by the Act, but instead will depend on the politi-
cal will of Congress and the President.
The Act does not provide conditional indemnification of suc-
cessful claims by third party litigants against SFPs and does not
mandate licensed operators place SFPs under the protection of
insurance policies. 112 As a result, if SFPs want protection against
personal liability, they must secure their own insurance, either
through operator policies or through an independent SFP in-
surance policy." 3 Even if SFPs attempt to secure insurance, it is
unclear whether the insurance industry will be willing to insure
individual SFPs and, if so, to what amount and at what premium.
Exclusion of SFPs from federal catastrophic indemnification ex-
poses SFPs to unlimited liability and potentially raises insurance
liability premiums. Operators can rely on provisional cata-
strophic indemnification provisions, receiving what is in essence
a federal subsidy for catastrophic liability insurance, but SFPs
are provided only the protection they can afford to purchase or
negotiate.
XII. SFP INFORMED CONSENT: A NEED TO CLARIFY
THE CONCEPT AND APPLICATION TO CHSF
Consent is legally effective assent and is "an affirmative de-
fense to assault, battery, and related torts, as well as such torts as
defamation, invasion of privacy, conversion, and trespass.""' 4 In-
formed consent is a term traditionally applied within the con-
text of professional negligence cases, in particular medical
malpractice, and is "[a] person's agreement to allow something
to happen, made with full knowledge of the risks involved and
the alternatives.""' 5 "What makes informed consent unique is
that something is done to the participant by another party (usu-
ally the medical provider) with the participant's consent." '116 In-
formed consent is sometimes used in an adventure sports/
tourism context when assessing whether professional guides are
112 Id.
113 Hughes & Rosenburg, supra note 102 (stating that "nothing prevents a li-
censee or operator from adding individual space flight participants as additional
insureds under its liability policy. In fact, a smart consumer might demand it and
a smart operator might offer it as a competitive advantage.").
114 BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 323.
115 Id.
116 Knutson, supra note 35, at 110.
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negligent for failing to disclose information to clients regarding
risks associated with different choices available."i7
The Act and Regulations (§ 460.45) mandate CHSF vehicle
operators inform each SFP in writing about the risk of the
launch and reentry, including the safety record of the vehicle
type before receiving compensation from or agreeing to fly an
SFP." 8 For each mission, operators must inform SFPs, in writ-
ing, of the known hazards and risks that could result in serious
injury, death, disability, or total or partial loss of physical and
mental function, and disclose that participation may result in
these hazards and risks.'19 Operators must also disclose that
there are unknown hazards, that the U.S. Government has not
certified the CHSF vehicle as safe for carrying crew or SFPs, and
provide a safety record of all launch and reentry vehicles that
have carried one or more persons aboard. 20 These disclosure
requirements are considered the "informed consent" provisions
of the CLSAA-2004.121
The fulfillment of CLSAA-2004 informed consent require-
ments will not serve as enforceable release and waiver contracts
or satisfy requirements for common law defenses associated with
assumption of risk simply because the term "implied consent"
has been adopted in parlance. The legal effect of CHSF opera-
tor compliance with CLSAA-2004 "implied consent" provisions,
as either contractual or common law tort defenses, will be deter-
mined under applicable state law.
XIII. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Vicarious liability is "[I]iability that a supervisory party (such
as an employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a
subordinate or associate (such as an employee) based on the
relationship between the two parties."'122 "The vicarious liability
of an employer for torts committed by employees should not be
confused with the liability an employer has for his own torts. An
employer whose employee commits a tort may be liable in his
117 Ross CLOUTIER ET AL., LEGAL LIABILITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN ADVEN-
TURE TOURISM 18 (2000).
118 Commercial Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. § 70101-70121 (2000 &
Supp. V 2006); Commercial Space Transportation Regulations, 14 C.F.R.
§ 460.45 (2008).
1"9 14 C.F.R. § 460.45.
120 Id.
12, Hughes & Rosenburg, supra note 102, at 51.
122 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 934.
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own right for negligence in hiring or supervising the
employee. '"123
When a CHSF vehicle pilot 124 or crew member is an agent of
the CHSF operators and is acting within the scope of authority
or employment at the time of an accident, the pilot and/or crew
liability can be imputed to the CHSF operator through the doc-
trine of respondent superior.125
XIV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The manufacturers of CHSF vehicle and component parts
may be subject to products liability claims. "Products liability
[claims] can be based on a theory of negligence, strict liability,
or breach of warranty. "126
In the event of a CHSF vehicle accident, persons (i.e., SFPs
and third parties) who suffer injury or death may sue vehicle
manufacturers under a theory of negligence or strict liability.1 27
To successfully litigate a strict products liability claim, plaintiffs
must prove that:
the goods were unreasonably dangerous and that (1) the seller
was in the business of selling goods, (2) the goods were defective
when they were in the seller's hands, (3) the defect caused the
plaintiffs injury, and (4) the product was expected to and did
reach the consumer without substantial change in condition. 128
"A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution,
it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is
defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. '129
Claims of defective design will likely be difficult to maintain
given the infantile state of CHSF vehicle manufacturing. Prod-
ucts are
123 Id. (quoting KENNETH S. ABRAHAm, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT
LAw 166 (2002)).
124 Commercial Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. § 70102(2) (2000 & Supp.
V 2006). Note that the CLSAA definition of CHSF "crew" includes pilots. Id.
125 TURLEY, supra note 20, at 118 (explaining that in commercial aviation
"[w]here a pilot is an agent or employee acting within the scope of authority or
employment at the time of an accident, the pilot's liability can be imputed to the
pilot's principal or employer, frequently an air carrier or the government,
through the doctrine of respondent superior."). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY, supra note 17, at 1338.
126 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1245.
127 See id.
128 Id. at 1245-46.
129 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
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defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the product[s] could have been reduced or avoided by the adop-
tion of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other dis-
tributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders
the product[s] not reasonably safe.°
The difficulty for plaintiffs is to propose reasonable alternative
designs for an industry that has yet to establish design standards,
in which vehicle manufacturers are developing a variety of vehi-
cles with an array of functionalist characteristics, and for which
no federal or state law provides vehicle design guidance beyond
the limited regulations relating to vehicle design features for the
purpose of protecting the crew as an integral part of the flight
safety system.131
Breach of warranty and other actions initiated by CHSF vehi-
cle operators against vehicle manufacturers are subject to the
Act's mandatory reciprocal cross-waiver provisions. 32 Under
these provisions, the manufacturers and operators sign recipro-
cal cross-waivers under which each party agrees to be responsi-
ble for property damage or loss it sustains.' 3  In addition, each
party agrees to be responsible for personal injury to, death of, or
property damage or loss sustained by its own employees result-
ing from an activity carried out under the applicable license. 413
SFPs are specifically excluded from the mandatory cross-waiver
provisions.135 This exclusion leaves open the possibility of CHSF
operators suing manufacturers for indemnification of damages
paid to injured SFPs. Manufacturers may also be sued for in-
demnification of damages paid to injured third parties. The Act
does not prohibit manufacturers and operators from con-
tracting for obligations associated with third party claims in the
event of a CHSF vehicle accident.
130 Id.
131 Final Rule on Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space
Flight Participants, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,618 n. 4 (Dec. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 460).
132 This is because CHSF vehicle and component parts manufacturers fall
within the mandatory reciprocal cross-waiver definition of contractors and sub-
contractors. See Commercial Space Transportation Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 440.3
(2008).
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XV. PROTECTING AGAINST ECONOMIC LOSS
ATTRIBUTED TO TORT LIABILITY RESULTING
FROM A CHSF VEHICLE ACCIDENT
Limiting and mitigating risk of exposure to tort liability is crit-
ical for the success of the CHSF industry. Operators, employees,
and manufacturers need a predictable liability regime that limits
potential loss in order to facilitate the industrial, financial, and
operational development of CHSF. Liability without mitigation,
defense, or insurance could bankrupt the CHSF industry and
expose industry participants to personal liability. SFPs, the cus-
tomers of the CHSF industry, may also be subject to tort litiga-
tion and need protection against this exposure.
In order to protect against economic loss attributed to tort
liability exposure, prior to the accident, operators, pilots/crew,
SFPs, and manufacturers will want to implement risk mitigation
measures designed to limit their respective tort liability expo-
sures. Risk mitigation measures include liability insurance,
waiver and releases, and other agreements that shift risk of loss.
In some instances, the parties' respective interests will align and
allow for collaborative risk mitigation measures. In other in-
stances, their interests will conflict and they will attempt to shift
risk liability to each other.
XVI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A unified tort legal regime is needed to facilitate investment
and growth. State law currently governs tort liability standards,
enforceability of risk allocation agreements, releases and waiv-
ers, and various other elements of tort liability law. As a result,
applicable laws will depend on a host of unknown variables in-
cluding where an accident occurred, where the case is litigated,
and choice of law provisions. Federal legislation is needed that
supersedes state liability law and creates a predictable liability
regime for the commercial space industry. This legislation
should establish standards for assumption of risks and waivers of
liability, exclude SFPs from joint and several liability for CHSF
operator negligence, and resolve whether damage caused on
the ground, in the air, and in outer space is subject to strict
liability. As an alternative, a tort liability regime can be achieved
by creating a uniform model code subject to state-by-state adop-
tion. The disadvantage of this alternative option is that true uni-
formity will not be achieved because states will modify the model
code to best serve state interests.
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ASSESSING THE RISKS
SFPs should be advised of the financial risks of CHSF and take
steps to protect against potential tort liability. The current sys-
tem grants SFPs a wide degree of freedom to mitigate potential
liability by choosing whether they participate in CHSF, obtain
liability insurance, and/or contract with CHSF operators to shift
liability risks. While SFPs have the freedom to mitigate potential
liability, they are also exposed to unlimited liability without pro-
visional federal indemnification.
CHSF operators should take heed of potential SFP liability for
their own business success and the success of this fledgling in-
dustry. Let us not forget that the SFPs are providing the de-
mand for the industry. CHSF operators should consider
voluntarily including SFPs on their insurance policies, con-
tracting for risk shifting and assumptions of risk in an open and
transparent manner, and minimizing the operational risk of SFP
negligence causing injury to third parties. How the CHSF indus-
try conducts itself at this point in development will set the stage
for the next round of legislation and regulations. By taking
proactive voluntary steps to protect the interests of SFPs, the in-
dustry will promote an image of self responsibility.
Liability insurance may be difficult to obtain at economically
feasible rates for operators, crew/pilots, manufacturers, SFPs,
and other members of the CHSF industry. If the liability insur-
ance market is not able to provide insurance at economically
feasible rates, then Congress or state legislatures should con-
sider publicly subsidizing insurance rates. Publicly subsidized
insurance can be instituted with tax-based policies in the form of
tax credits or deductions to underwrite the purchase of
insurance.'36
Congress and state legislatures should also postpone terminat-
ing indemnification and immunity legislation. The indemnifica-
tion provisions under the Act only apply to complete and valid
applications received no later than December 31, 2009.13' The
Space Flight Act expires on July 1, 2013.138
136 J.A. VEDDA, NAT'L SPACE Sys. ENG'G, STUDY OF THE LIABILITY RISK-SHARING
REGIME IN THE UNITED STATES FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION 32
(2006), available at http://www2.faa.gov/about/office-org/headquartersof-
fices/ast/reportsstudies/rnedia/RiskStudy (final) .pdf.
137 49 U.S.C. § 70113(f).
138 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.0-227.8-8.0-227.9 (2009).
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XVII. ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL ACCIDENTS AND
RELATED QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The focus of this article is U.S. tort liability law in the event of
a CHSF vehicle accident that occurs in the United States on a
flight that departs and arrives from points within the United
States. However, it is important to note that legal complexities
and challenges will arise if a U.S. licensed CHSF vehicle has an
accident outside the territory of the United States, involves non-
U.S. nationals, or occurs while a CHSF vehicle is engaged in
what is deemed international transport of passengers for the
purpose of private international air law. Similar to the multiplic-
ity of U.S. domestic tort jurisdictions resulting from the non-
harmonized system of U.S. tort law, there is no harmonization of
international law or the law between foreign sovereigns to gov-
ern CHSF tort liability, unless international air law agreements
governing tort liability are deemed applicable to CHSF
vehicles.139
139 The primary multilateral international air law agreements governing tort
liability are the Montreal Convention of 1999 and the Warsaw Convention. Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air,
May 28, 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Montreal Convention of 1999];
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Car-
riage by Air, Oct. 29, 1929, 137 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
These conventions apply to all "international carriage of persons, luggage or
goods performed by aircraft for reward" and "gratuitous carriage by aircraft per-
formed by an air transport undertaking." Warsaw Convention at art. I. Before a
CHSF can be deemed subject to these Conventions, first the CHSF vehicle must
be deemed an aircraft performing international carriage. International carriage
for the purposes of these Conventions is defined as:
any carriage in which, according to the contract made by the par-
ties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or
not there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated
either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or
within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an
agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty,
suzerainty, mandate or authority of another Power, even though
that Power is not a party to this Convention. A carriage without
such an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the
sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High
Contracting Party is not deemed to be international for the pur-
poses of this Convention.
Id. The term "aircraft" is not defined in the instruments of international public
or private air law, but only defined in the annexes promulgated by ICAO in ac-
cordance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Ultimately,
whether or not the Warsaw Convention, Montreal Convention of 1999, or the
Convention on International Civil Aviation will be deemed applicable to CHSF is
a political question. Legally, the term "aircraft" will need to be interpreted or
ASSESSING THE RISKS
Until legal harmonization is achieved at both the domestic
and international levels, the CHSF industry will be subject to a
multiplicity of jurisdictions with varying legal standards, unable
to predict and mitigate tort liability risks with a high degree of
precision.
XVIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Federal law provides minimum guidance on CHSF tort liabil-
ity, only legislating in the areas of mandatory crow-waivers of lia-
bility, licensee insurance and financial responsibility
requirements, and catastrophic indemnification. CHSF tort lia-
bility is therefore primarily governed by state law, with litigants
subject to a multiplicity of jurisdictions without unified stan-
dards. As a result, parties involved in CHSF must do their best
to formulate potential risks by drawing parallels to other estab-
lished industries such as aviation and adventure sports/tourism.
Interested parties should undertake legal risk mitigation mea-
sures that minimize exposure and protect against tort liability.
In the long term, the CHSF industry will require a unified tort
liability regime, on both a national and international level, to
facilitate investment and growth while promoting predictability
and equitable compensation for accident victims. On the na-
tional level, this regime should be established through Congres-
sional legislation premised on authority granted under the
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. Internationally,
States should adopt a multilateral CHSF tort liability regime that
governs passengers, cargo, and third party ground, air, and
space damage.
defined to include CHSF. This is an open question that has yet to be resolved.
For a more detailed analysis of ICAO's jurisdiction over CHSF, as well as the
impact of concurrent-conflicting international regimes applicable to CHSF, see
PAUL S. DEMPSEY AND MICHAEL C. MINEIRO, THE INTERSECTION OF AIR AND SPACE
LAw: ICAO's ROLE IN REGULATING SAFETY AND NAVIGATION IN SUBORBITAL AERO-
SPACE TRANSPORTATION (unpublished manuscript but scheduled to be presented
and published to the IAASS in Rome October 21-23, 2008).
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